Thoughts about MCB Installed Director, page-7

My comments is best, being based on the remuneration issue as it is the most contentious issue that most retail shareholders concentrate on; even thou it mechanism is applicable to installing a puppet director aligned to MCB.

What I find ironic, is that we don’t have a default voting system for retail investors who have been disenfranchised by the preponderance to invoke the poll voting system.
Reiterating that the my premise is based on, that the aim of poll voting is to control the rewards for cohorts within the,"Institute of Directors” and management team.

What should happen is that the lazy and indifferent retail shareholder’s who don’t bother to vote should be deemed as a vote against the remuneration rewards.
That would mean that out off 148,000 eligible voters, 144,000 accumulated poll votes could possibly be against the remuneration resolution.

In the case of AGL, it would still be difficult to surpass the votes off the T 20 who hold over 50% off shareholding’s votes.

My reasoning for this amendment is because we allow votes to be counted for the lazy and indifferent beneficiary holders within Custodian and Nominee’s companies.

Further to the privilege afforded to the overseer off these entities, s/he can refuse to send voting information to the beneficiary owners....modern technology should’ve negated the excuse to not to collate the voting intentions of the beneficiary owners.

All beneficiary shareholder’s have a right to vote on most resolutions thru these entities.

So these intermediary rely on the ultimate decision of an individual and my arguments justify change to, “one vote per individual or entity”, only for public listed companies.

I believe that my comments are valid to instigate an uprising against the poll voting system for a public listed company.