time to go and knock on mr green door, page-4

Now is the time for focus.

Goldmine Stacks and the Banking Consortium have signaled, through Friday's announcement, that they intend making a meal of BNBG holders capital.

You would normally think that as debt holders, BNBG holders would be "inside the tent", rather than "outside" (interests aligned with the senior debt holders).

However, it is clear, that greedy Goldmine Stacks will sacrifice the BNBG debt as their first move. (I had hoped that the debt for equity deal would leave something for everyone - I do not fully understand why our directors are making these repetitive announcements of negative equity - I do fear it is some "softening up" exercise).

The key fact is, BNBG holders only have one point of leverage. BBIPL - the operating entity of BNB - guarantees the interest and capital of the BNBG's.

At the moment - we are not direct debt holders in BBIPL.

At the moment - you can be assured that Goldmine Stacks are assiduously working to undermine the value of the BBIPL guarantee.

The most ideal situation would be if we could show that banking consortium actions, through negligence, have caused the value of this guarantee to be compromised. We sue for damages with the face value of the debt being the quantum of our recovery.

I wonder if the following would make a reasonable case:

- the global banks have acted recklessly, in terms of lending policy, globally. This is the essence of the credit crisis.

- do the banks have a "duty of care" to the BNBG holders not to allow reckless over-extension of credit offered to BBIPL, undermining the value of the subordinated debt guarantee?

- is there a case to answer, here?

If the BNBG holders found legal representation prepared to argue the case in return for a hefty percentage of the damages; I wonder how many BNBG holders would go for this idea? Lets say $100 face as damages split 50:50 between the legal firm and the BNBG holder - all direct costs to the legal firm.

We setup an incorporated society - holders contribute their BNBG's, for a prorated interest. The society votes the block as a single unit and is wound up, at the end of the case - with anything left over distributed pro rata.

Of course this can only happen in the event of administration and AFTER the creditors meeting.

Question: In Australian Insolvency law - is nomination of the receiver over 50% by value AND 50% by number? That is, if 2,000 BNBG holders turn up - they can block the recommentation by 20 banks even though they only represent 5% of the debt?

/disclosure: BNBG holder - no BNB