''My claim is free will can't be proved or disproved absolutely.''
you argue as if you have the truth.
That is your confidence over your abilities profiling very poorly.
Free will is generally understood as the ability to freely choose our own actions and determine our own outcomes. ... For instance, research has found that promoting the idea that a person doesn't have free will makes people become more dishonest, behave aggressively, and even conform to others' thoughts and opinions.29 Sept 2016Some argue that placing the question of free will in the context of motor control is too narrow. The objection is that the time scales involved in motor control are very short, and motor control involves a great deal of unconscious action, with much physical movement entirely unconscious. On that basis "... free will cannot be squeezed into time frames of 150–350 ms; free will is a longer term phenomenon" and free will is a higher level activity that "cannot be captured in a description of neural activity or of muscle activation...."[180] The bearing of timing experiments upon free will is still under discussion.
More studies have since been conducted, including some that try to:
- support Libet's original findings
- suggest that the cancelling or "veto" of an action may first arise subconsciously as well
- explain the underlying brain structures involved
- suggest models that explain the relationship between conscious intention and action
Benjamin Libet's results are quoted[181] in favor of epiphenomenalism, but he believes subjects still have a "conscious veto", since the readiness potential does not invariably lead to an action. In Freedom Evolves, Daniel Dennett argues that a no-free-will conclusion is based on dubious assumptions about the location of consciousness, as well as questioning the accuracy and interpretation of Libet's results. Kornhuber and Deecke underlined that absence of conscious will during the early Bereitschaftspotential (termed BP1) is not a proof of the non-existence of free will, as also unconscious agendas may be free and non-deterministic. According to their suggestion, man has relative freedom, i.e. freedom in degrees, that can be increased or decreased through deliberate choices that involve both conscious and unconscious (panencephalic) processes.[182]
Others have argued that data such as the Bereitschaftspotential undermine epiphenomenalism for the same reason, that such experiments rely on a subject reporting the point in time at which a conscious experience occurs, thus relying on the subject to be able to consciously perform an action. That ability would seem to be at odds with early epiphenomenalism, which according to Huxley is the broad claim that consciousness is "completely without any power… as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery".[183]
Adrian G. Guggisberg and Annaïs Mottaz have also challenged those findings.[184]
A study by Aaron Schurger and colleagues published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences[185] challenged assumptions about the causal nature of the readiness potential itself (and the "pre-movement buildup" of neural activity in general), casting doubt on conclusions drawn from studies such as Libet's[175] and Fried's.[186]
A study that compared deliberate and arbitrary decisions, found that the early signs of decision are absent for the deliberate ones.[187]
It has been shown that in several brain-related conditions, individuals cannot entirely control their own actions, though the existence of such conditions does not directly refute the existence of free will. Neuroscientific studies are valuable tools in developing models of how humans experience free will.
