treaty key to australia attending summit, page-6

Like all contracts, the devil is in the detail.....in particular , the interpretation.

as David Dickens and Guy Wilson-Roberts noted in a fascinating paper published in 2000 by New Zealand's Centre for Strategic Studies. Among the other things, the treaty has imposed the following obligations on signatories

1/ Refraining from criticising the actions of the governments of member-states towards its (sic) own people.

2/ Directing criticism at the actions of states that are perceived to constitute a breach of the principle of non-intervention.

3/ Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilise or overthrow the government of a neighbouring state.

4/ Providing political support and material assistance to member-states in their actions against subversive activities.

What would that mean had Australia signed on, say, a decade ago?

Point One would have precluded Australian involvement in the liberation of East Timor.

Point Two would have invited all other ASEAN members to criticise Australia for that involvement, perhaps to collectively impose penalties and sanctions.

Point Three would have seen hundreds of Timorese refugees shipped back across the Torres Strait to face Indonesian justice, and

Point Four would have meant, if pursued absurdum, that Australia was obliged to endorse and assist in the suppression of East Timor's native home-rule movement.

If all of the above seems a point stretched beyond breaking, read what Dickens and Wilson-Roberts say of ASEAN's response -- or, more correctly, lack of one -- to the ongoing tyranny in Myanamar. That silence has nothing to do with the United States, pre-emptive strikes or John Howard's playing the regional Chester to President Bush's Matt Dillon.