Michael Pezzullo is a former deputy secretary of defence and was secretary of home affairs until November 2023
By Mark Pezullo 8 March 2025 (Printed in The Australian) Beijing deployed a naval task group to the waters around Australia for three related reasons. First, to demonstrate the reach and potency of Chinese sea power and to put Australia on notice that it is vulnerable to the application of that power. Second, to test our political and military responses. Third, to rehearse for wartime operations against Australia. Thanks for reading Steve’s Blizard's Notable Observations! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work. Regarding the last, the deployment was most likely a rehearsal run for the conduct of a seaborne missile strike on Australia, with China testing how it might most effectively launch missile strikes on Australian military facilities and critical national infrastructure. The task group was led by a powerful cruiser that was equipped with 112 missile cells from which long-range land attack cruise missiles could be launched at targets across Australia. In wartime, such an operation would be conducted by an even larger and better protected surface action task group, most probably consisting of the same type of cruiser, one or two escorting destroyers, one or two submarines and a replenishment tanker. The mission of the task group would be to fight through any opposing, mainly Australian, forces to get into optimal firing positions in the waters around Australia. China would assume that in any plausible scenario where it might need to launch such an attack against Australia—as part of a broader US-China war—scarce US naval and air units almost certainly would be heavily engaged elsewhere in the broader Indo-Pacific region and therefore its attacking force would be able to fight through light, mainly Australian, defending forces. This is not to say that our treaty ally, the United States, would not willingly come to our aid in such a scenario. The reality, however, is that in any such war the US would have very little spare capacity to do so.It is not that we would be abandoned. Rather, the defence of Australia would be prioritised by the US according to the imperatives of the broader fight and we would be expected to do more for ourselves. China also most likely would undertake air-launched long-range missile strikes against Australia. These would involve long-range missiles being launched by H-6 bombers, which most likely would fire them from the north of Indonesia, beyond the perceived range of Australia’s air defences. Submarines also probably would be sent to attack shipping around Australia, mine our ports and sea lanes and destroy undersea cables. China’s relatively small number of aircraft carriers means it is unlikely that Australia would be subjected to carrier-borne air raids, but the possibility should not be discounted, especially as the Chinese aircraft carrier fleet grows in strength. We should not delude ourselves that the deployment was a benign exercise, conducted ‘lawfully’ in international waters—with the underlying imputation being that is simply what great powers do.Regrettably, this was the theme of the Australian government’s initial response, which could not have been better scripted in Beijing itself.The deployment was a rehearsal and, at the same time, a menacing attempt at strategic intimidation, designed to increase anxiety in the Australian population about China’s growing military power and fuel domestic doubts about the wisdom of potentially risking conflict with China—for instance, over Taiwan. This day of reckoning was long coming. Once China decided in the early 2000s to develop a blue-water navy, it was always going to focus some of its attention on our sea-air approaches and our nearby waters. This is because Beijing understands that, as a matter of geostrategic logic, Australia’s size and geographical location would be a valuable wartime asset for the US. Neutralising that advantage is a key consideration for People’s Liberation Army war planners. The PLA could not afford to yield to the US uncontested access to such a significant and secure bastion and staging area, where US forces could be concentrated in protected locations out of the reach of most of China’s conventional arsenal and from where devastating US strikes could be mounted on Chinese forces and bases in the littoral areas of East Asia, the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. While it has not taken a definitive decision to go to war, China has moved into a rehearsal phase for such a conflict. It is determined to give itself the option of fighting and winning a war against the US and its allies. It therefore has to test all of its operational plans, including the neutralisation of Australia’s wartime utility.We are not special in this regard. China is rehearsing its war plans across the entire Pacific—including in relation to establishing sea control in the littoral rim of East Asia, from Japan to Indonesia, denying US sea and air access to that littoral rim, holding at risk US carrier strike groups and bases, such as Guam, and striking at more distant US staging areas, such as Alaska, Hawaii and Australia. PLA war planning calculations have nothing to do with the tone or the content of the bilateral Australia-China relationship. They are a function of the hard-headed judgments that PLA war planners need to make. We could have a perfectly ‘stabilised’ relationship, with copious quantities of Australian wine and lobster flowing into Chinese ports, and still be on the PLA’s strike list. Unfortunately, our response to the deployment was shaped principally by those whose focus is obsessively fixed on the state of the bilateral relationship rather than by those who are paid to think and advise in geostrategic terms. We should expect more such demonstrations of power projection by China, using not only surface vessels but also submarines, carrier strike groups and H-6 bombers. Such power projection is commonplace around the rimlands and littoral regions of Eurasia, where Chinese, Russian and, increasingly, combined Chinese-Russian operations are mounted frequently against the US (including around Alaska and off Hawaii), Canada, Britain, Japan, Taiwan, The Philippines and others. We have much to learn from these allies and partners in terms of how they deal with such frequent and persistent Chinese and Russian visitors. Until now Australia has been located safely away from this contact zone of Eurasia, with only Imperial Germany before WWI and Imperial Japan in the early years of the Pacific war of 1941-45 darkening our frontiers. Today we are no longer protected by distance. Thankfully, there is a ready-made solution to this geostrategic problem. Ever since Kim Beazley commissioned Paul Dibb in February 1985 to conduct a review of Australia’s defence capabilities, the cardinal importance of defending Australia’s sea-air approaches has been at the core of defence planning, even if the requisite capabilities and level of funding required to carry out the resultant military strategy have never fully materialised. For 40 years, Australian defence planning has been founded on the idea of defending our area of direct military interest, which extends well beyond the continent and the immediate waters around Australia. This means seeking to deny to an adversary the ability to successfully move into and through the sea-air approaches to Australia. It also means achieving and maintaining sea control in key areas in the waters around Australia. Our strategy is to turn the vast archipelagic arc that extends from the waters to the west of Sumatra to those around Fiji into a great strategic barrier through which any adversary would have to move to attack Australia. Once this geostrategic logic is understood, much else falls into place—for instance, why it is that Australia could not allow itself to be outflanked to the northeast by the establishment of Chinese bases in the South Pacific, which would represent a catastrophic penetration of the barrier. In the same way that US president John Kennedy could not tolerate Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, we could not tolerate Chinese missile units or bombers having access to bases in the South Pacific.The geography of this barrier is such that the sea-air approaches to Australia naturally funnel ships and submarines into a small number of chokepoints. When exploited well, chokepoints favour the defender. They create killing zones where attacking forces can be destroyed before they can do harm. Australian defence planning also has to contemplate more distant operations, forward of the barrier, including in the South China Sea and in the southern portions of the Central Pacific (for instance, in the Guam-Bismarck Sea corridor) to attrite advancing adversary forces even before they reach the chokepoints. While we have the strategy, which was given its clearest expression in the 1987 and 2009 defence white papers and has been honed across 40 years since Dibb’s landmark report, we do not have the full suite of capabilities or the mindset to execute the strategy in the face of the gathering storm. We need to be ready by early 2027—which appears to be the earliest time that China will be ready to launch a military operation against Taiwan, which in turn may trigger a wider war. Of course, assumptions about whether and when China would do such a thing need to be kept under constant review. In strategy, everything is contingent and nothing is inevitable. If it is to come, war will break out whether we are ready or not. Having missed our chance more than 15 years ago to properly start to prepare—when dark prophesies of a possible war first emerged—we now have to do what we can in the time we have. We should urgently do the following things, which are over and above what has been decided by successive Australian governments, most recently in response to the 2023 Defence Strategic Review. 1. Enhance surveillanceFirst, we must enhance the continuous wide-area surveillance of our area of direct military interest. We must be able to pinpoint the precise locations and track the movement of Chinese (and Russian) ships, submarines and aircraft of interest as far from Australia as possible. This will require the more intensive use and meshing together of the sensor feeds from national intelligence systems, space-based sensors, the Jindalee radar network, P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, MQ-4C Triton surveillance drones, E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft, undersea sensors and other assets.
A fused situational picture of key Chinese and Russian movements in our area of direct military interest should be developed and shared in real time with US Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii in exchange for its fused picture of the same. This will require more resources to support 24/7 operations in the Australian Defence Force and the relevant intelligence agencies. Wide-area surveillance of our area of direct military interest cannot be a business-hours activity. 2. Lift operational readinessSecond, we must enhance ADF operational readiness, which means having more forces standing ready to undertake quick alert missions, such as air interceptions and maritime surveillance flights. This will cost money and drain crews as they will fatigue more rapidly when kept at higher states of readiness. More assertive rules of engagement should be authorised by the defence minister to allow for the close shadowing of Chinese and Russian units in our area of direct military interest. This would be done in a safe and professional manner, as it is being done nearly every other day by our allies and partners who are being probed regularly at sea and in the air. The ADF’s Joint Operations Command should be reconfigured along the lines of the original vision of defence force chief General John Baker, who in 1996 established the Australian Theatre Command, or COMAUST. Baker’s logic was that the ADF should be postured, and commanded, principally to conduct operations in Australia’s area of direct military interest. While operations farther afield would be undertaken from time to time, they should not be the main focus of the ADF. After 9/11, the ADF adopted a globalist orientation. Mastery of the area of direct military interest started to fall away. It is time for the ADF to focus zealously once again on the defence of Australia’s area of direct military interest, and our national military command arrangements and systems should reflect this. 3. Acquire longer-range anti-surface warfare capabilitiesThird, we must urgently acquire longer-range anti-surface warfare capabilities. A radical suggestion would be to acquire rapidly six to 10 B-1B Lancer bombers from the US Air Force’s inventory. B-1Bs have been configured in recent years for anti-ship strike missions. Each is now able to carry 36 Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (24 internally in bomb bays and 12 externally), which is a fearsome anti-surface capability. While the RAAF already is acquiring the LRASM weapon for use by its F/A-18F Super Hornets, having a platform in the order of battle with the range and payload capacity of the B-1B Lancer would severely impair PLA options for mounting surface action missions against Australia. 4. Acquire longer-range air superiority capabilityFourth, we must urgently acquire a longer-range air superiority capability to deal with the threat of stand-off attacks by PLA Air Force H-6 bombers operating north of Indonesia. Again, a radical suggestion would be to acquire rapidly the air-to-air version of the SM-6 missile to equip the RAAF’s F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters. Facing such fighters, especially if they were operating forward of the barrier, would make PLA planners think twice about mounting long-range bomber missions against Australia. 5. Remediate naval warfare capabilityFifth, we urgently need to remediate our naval warfare capability, to ensure that our battle fleet of six Collins-class submarines and 10 major surface combatants (the Hobart and Anzac classes) are fully crewed and ready for action. This will require crewing, training, inventory and maintenance issues to be addressed. The RAN’s replenishment tankers need to be fixed and returned to the fleet as soon as possible. Across time, the RAN battle fleet will need to grow in size, given the rapid growth in the PLA Navy’s battle fleet. Ideally, we should be aiming across the longer term for a battle fleet of 12 submarines, 20 major surface combatants and 20 smaller offshore combatants, the last of which could be used as missile corvettes and naval mine warfare vessels. To further enhance the RAN’s battle fleet, our large landing helicopter dock vessels should be re-purposed as sea control carriers, with embarked anti-submarine and airborne early warning helicopters and long-range naval drones. 6. Ensure RAAF is battle readySixth, we need to ensure that the RAAF is battle ready, with its squadrons fully crewed and its air bases well protected and fully functional. It is relatively easier to expand an air force, as compared with a navy, given the vagaries of naval shipbuilding. The RAAF is therefore the better bet in terms of a rapid expansion that could be achieved soonest. More F-35 Lightning II fighters should be acquired, along with the B-1B Lancers mentioned already. The latter could serve as an interim bomber, pending reconsideration of the acquisition of the B-21 Raider strategic bomber. Crewing ratios should be increased quickly, such that the RAAF has more crews than aircraft, which could then be flown more intensively. The extraordinarily rapid expansion of the RAAF’s aircrew training pipeline in World War II should be its guiding vision. 7. Push forward army’s maritime capabilitySeventh, the army should continue to develop its increasingly impressive maritime warfare capabilities and readiness. Consideration should be given to the rapid acquisition of the ground-based Typhon missile system, which would give the army a long-range anti-ship and land strike capability. As we barricade the sea-air approaches to Australia, we will have to be vigilant in relation to stealthy commando raids and sabotage operations. The army will need to be postured to deal with such attacks. 8. Address capability gapsEighth, we need to remediate a number of other capability gaps where we have no or virtually no capability. Of particular concern is integrated air and missile defence. We will need to acquire some combination of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot interceptors on land and SM-3 interceptors at sea. Naval mine warfare capability also needs to be addressed. There are likely to be other gaps that would impair our ability to execute the strategy. Given the urgency of the situation, rapidly acquired interim solutions will have to suffice to fill many of these gaps. Such interim solutions can be refined and built on. That is the lesson of the Russo-Ukrainian war. 9. Negotiate PNG allianceNinth, a military alliance should be negotiated with Papua New Guinea to provide for the establishment of ADF bases in locations such as Manus, Rabaul and Lae to support the conduct of maritime surveillance, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and air superiority missions. For instance, a forward-deployed composite RAAF wing, consisting of F-35A Lightning fighters, B-1B Lancers armed with LRASM, F/A-18F Super Hornets armed with SM-6 missiles, and P-8 Poseidon maritime aircraft could operate from the Bismarck to the Celebes seas and beyond with the aim of denying access into our northern sea-air approaches. A similar alliance should be negotiated with The Philippines. This would extend our coverage north of the barrier into the South China Sea. We need to better appreciate the significance of PNG and the Philippines as Pacific watchtowers of the sea-air approaches to Australia. Our Indian Ocean territories are our western watchtowers. 10. Develop a war bookTenth, we should urgently reinstate the practice of developing a war book that would deal with civil defence, national cyber defence, the protection of critical infrastructure and the general protection, and sustainment of the population during times of war.While the likelihood of war in the foreseeable future is low, perhaps 10 to 20 per cent, it is enough to warrant action. This will cost money and divert resources from more agreeable activities. That is the nature of war, which drains societies even when it does not occur. Against this must be weighed the costs of being unprepared. While this worsening strategic environment is very confronting, there is an even darker scenario. Imagine if we had to face a coercive, belligerent, and unchecked China on our own. That would require a very different military strategy and a significantly larger ADF. That is a grim story for another day—and one that may require us to pursue our own Manhattan Project. In that world, we would look fondly on this relatively benign age. Author Michael Pezzullo is a former deputy secretary of defence and was secretary of home affairs until November 2023. This article is also published by The Australian. Image of a USAF B-1B Lancer bomber and an RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornet (top picture): Department of Defence. Image of Royal Australian Navy sailors on HMAS Arunta watching the Chinese replenishment ship Weishanhu and frigate Hengyang in the Tasman Sea (second picture): Department of Defence:. Map of Australia, East Asia and the Pacific (third picture) Google Earth. Image of a Chinese H-6 bomber with two fighters (last picture): Chinese Ministry of National Defense. Original article here Thanks for reading Steve’s Blizard's Notable Observations! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work. Steve’s Blizard's Notable Observations is free today. 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