west’s tears for darfur---norm dixon

  1. 301 Posts.
    Oil profits behind West’s tears for Darfur —Part I - By Norm Dixon


    For at least 18 months now, Western governments have quietly stood by as the non-Arabic-speaking black farmers of the Darfur region in western Sudan have borne the brunt of a vicious ethnic-cleansing campaign carried out by state-sponsored bandits known as the Janjaweed.

    Refugees report that attacks on farming villages are often preceded by raids by Sudanese air force fighter-bombers and attack helicopters. The Janjaweed, recruited from Arabic-speaking pastoralist tribes, then routinely murder any male villagers they can get their hands on, systematically rape or kidnap the women, and plunder and destroy the villages and crops. The attacks and their consequences have resulted in the deaths of up to 50,000 people and the displacement of 1.5 million; aid agencies warn that hundreds of thousands may die from disease or starvation in the coming months.

    Why then have the governments of the United States and the European Union (EU) only now begun to express concern over the fate of the people of western Sudan and demand that the Islamist military regime in Khartoum bring the Janjaweed under control? The answer - as it most often is when rich countries threaten to intervene in the Middle East and Africa - is access to invest in and extract profits from Sudan’s burgeoning oil export industry. Pressure on Khartoum

    Beginning in earnest in July, Washington, backed by the EU, began to ratchet up the pressure on Khartoum to rein in the Janjaweed. On July 1, US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Khartoum, where he sternly warned Sudan’s government: "Unless we see more moves soon ... it may be necessary for the international community to begin considering other actions, to include Security Council action."

    Three days later, with Powell’s threats still ringing in their ears, Sudan’s rulers issued a joint communiquÈ with UN secretary-general Kofi Annan in which they promised to "immediately start disarming the Janjaweed and other armed outlaw groups", "allow the deployment of human rights monitors" and "ensure that all individuals and groups accused of human rights violations are brought to justice without delay".

    The Sudanese government committed itself to "ensure that no militia are present in areas surrounding internally displaced persons camps" and pledged to "deploy a strong, credible and respected police force in all areas where there are displaced people, as well as areas susceptible to attacks". It was also agreed that an African Union military force of 300 troops would be allowed into Darfur to protect AU officials there to monitor a cease-fire negotiated in April between Khartoum and the main rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

    In mid-July, Powell circulated a draft UN Security Council resolution that threatened Khartoum with unspecified "sanctions" unless it implemented the July 3 UN-Sudan communiquÈ.

    Despite the fact that the draft UN resolution did not authorise the use of military force and there were no public plans for a UN intervention force in Darfur, the British and Australian governments added to Washington’s pressure on Khartoum by letting it be known that they were prepared to send troops to the region if called upon. Britain’s top commander, General Mike Jackson, said on July 26 that he could send 5000 troops to Sudan if needed, while on July 25 Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer, claiming to have received a "request from the United Nations", declared that "there’s a good chance that [Australia] will send some troops to Sudan".

    On July 22, the US Congress unanimously called on President George Bush to consider "multilateral or even unilateral intervention to prevent genocide should the United Nations Security Council fail to act". Agreement on a Security Council resolution remained stalled until late on July 29 when Washington finally dropped specific mention of the imposition of "sanctions" from the fourth draft. Eight of the UN Security Council’s 15 members - including veto-wielding China and Russia - had opposed the specific threat of sanctions.

    In its final form, the resolution warned that unless Khartoum made progress in implementing the July 3 communiquÈ within 30 days of the resolution’s adoption, the Security Council would "consider further actions, including measures as provided for in Article 41 [of the UN Charter]". Article 41 excludes military action but allows economic and diplomatic sanctions. The resolution was passed on July 31, by a margin of 13-0, with China and Pakistan abstaining. Oil

    Some left-wing commentators have interpreted the motive behind Washington’s newfound concern for Darfur - as well as the British and Australian governments’ volunteering of troops for a phantom UN intervention force - as an effort by Washington to justify an Iraq-style invasion of Sudan to achieve "regime change" and seize control of its potentially massive oil reserves.

    While US and European governments’ goal is renewed access by their countries oil corporations to Sudan’s oil wealth, Washington’s latest threats against Sudan are part of a "carrot and stick" approach that it has pursued with Khartoum since the 9/11 attacks. Knowing that Sudan is desperate to "normalise" relations with the US, Washington is attempting to lure Khartoum back into the neo-colonial fold using the "carrot" of promises to lift US economic sanctions imposed in 1997 and the "stick" of the threat of further sanctions. Such an approach was successful with neighbouring Libya.

 
arrow-down-2 Created with Sketch. arrow-down-2 Created with Sketch.