Agree with you there DalyWaters however I suspect the ACCC won't...

Agree with you there DalyWaters however I suspect the ACCC won't force the issue. In their 1 June announcement, the ACCC state:


Based on what's occurred since 1 June 2020:

• AQZ has had no issue raising funds, as evidenced by the success of the $91m share placement
• QAN doesn't appear to have hindered AQZ's ability to decide to commence RPT services in direct competition to QAN on a route where QAN has been the sole RPT operator for a few years.

It could be argued that QAN could prevent another party acquiring 100% of AQZ but in theory there is nothing (other than the ACCC) stopping another shareholder acquiring a greater than 50% shareholding in AQZ, and locking QAN into a minority position.

Without board representation, QAN's ability to exert direct influence through its shareholding is presumably limited. The top 20 shareholders detailed in the 2019 annual report held 89.5% of AQZ, so excluding QAN's then 19.8% you have 19 shareholders owning 69.7%. These shareholders (or a subset of them) have the ability to counteract any attempt by QAN to use its voting rights in a manner which is not in the best interests of AQZ. (I do concede that the recent share placement may have reduced this concentration somewhat).

While QAN to attempt to influence AQZ operationally by refusing to co-operate at any level (e.g. not using AQZ for wet lease charters, refusing any ground handling assistance, access to spare parts, etc.), QAN can choose to do this regardless of their shareholding.

So based on events since 1 June 2020 and my observations from the outside (and admittedly not being involved in the industry so not knowing what actually occurs in practice), I suspect that the ACCC will conclude no enforcement action is required. That's not to say that the ACCC stance would be very strong opposed if QAN sought approval to increase their AQZ shareholding above 20%.