Conventional roadmaps that focus initially on a Syrian Constitution after 9 years of total war will likely fail because there is no trust in room.
In long and drawn out conflicts such as the Syria wars, regular atrocities are committed by ALL sides.
Social and behavioural norms the rest of the world take for granted no longer exist. Normal military command structures don't always work either which is why poison gas canisters, if found by a local warlord or a couple of fighters will tend to be loaded and fired regardless.
Supporting one side in such conflicts inevitably dehumanises all of those on the other sides. This macabre form of childish stupidity continues to be played on by propagandists on all sides . External players to the Syria wars all dehumanise anyone they oppose in this space with a terrorist label. Opposing side deaths and casualty lists cab then be tallied as some kind of sadistic computer game score.
Let's get back to what needs to be done.
1. As outlined in some previous Council of Europe discussion papers (it's no policy) the West needs to acknowledge that the Damascus regime (for all its warts and crimes) is here to stay. On that basis the so-called West should now offer limited outreach to the Damascus regime. The goal would be to slowly bring that regime back to a semblance of normality by removing some of the paranoia and the Damascus regime's reliance on corrupt smuggling networks to keep everything partially afloat.
2. The West should join Russia in facilitating collaborative discussion between the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) administration of the North with the Damascus regime. IMHO it is far too early to propose a final governance structure for reasons stated above. I note that Assad says he is willing to retain SDC local administrative arrangements for now and he says that a return to more central control could be gradual. Both the Assad Regime and the SDC both need to accept that neither is going to get all that they want but that discussion can be postponed for now. The first goal has to be a cessation of the name calling, a little bit of trust building and a little bit of transparent trade.
3. The US needs to both stay put but keep quiet. Trust is everything in this space and Trump's continued backflips with the SDC (not just the Kurds within the SDC) has breeched that trust. Still, the US is in a good position to provide implied leverage on the side of the SDC towards a national reconciliation roadmap. Maybe the US could "allow" the oil to be transparently traded from the Omar fields to South Syria in the first instance. (yes I know that toadies will say that the US should not be holding the oil to ransom but we are looking for some long term outcomes here).
4. I'm personally out of my depth to proffer informed suggestions on Idlib. There are so many levels to consider here and without having feet on the ground in Syria I can't say much. Ican say that frank advice from the Sunni Arab entities variously aligned to the Assad Regime and the SDC is needed in the first instance. We also need to mature my thoughts on HTS to isolate the opportunities and threats posed by the organisation. I need to mature my thoughts on the Erdogan regime noting the linkages between their domestic agenda, that regimes perceived threats (and paranoia) and exactly how that links with the Turkish Syria agenda. Untangling the complexities of Turkish politics as they apply to Syria and Turkey's ongoing support of Islamist and Jihadist forces in Syria isn't an easy task. Maybe we could start by calling a spade a spade.
5. We need tag Bashar al Assad for who and what he actually is. Bashar is actually an ophthalmologist who never expected to be a dictator and never really sought that role. He became President because he was pre-deceased by his brother Bassel and because his father Hafez had set up a (controversial) dynastic succession plan that may have worked for Bassel but didn't work in the longer run for Bashar. Layered on top of that Hafez refused to step aside as his health failed dramatically in the late 1990's thus allowing other elements of the al Assad fiefdom exerted control. And so Bashar al Assad is the "butcher of Syria" NOT for what he commissioned but because he was unable or unwilling to decommission the excesses of his father's fiefdom. It is as it is. Hafez himself would not have allowed things to get out of control as they did. Hafez failed to realise that the Constitutional legacy he left his son was a loaded dog. Regardless, we must accept that Bashar is a figurehead and rallying point for his side. On the upside, Bashar does not come over me as a sociopath in the way that the other leaders, warlords and foreign presidents associated with the Syria and Iraq wars ALL DO.
6. Iran and Turkey needs to keep out of any discussion. In the unlikely event of a successful peace map for Syria, both Iran and Turkey will benefit financially and from the political maturity spin-offs of such an outcome.
Happy to hear what some of our pro-Putin posters and others have to say on this.
